Contextual deliberation and the choice-valuation preference reversal
研究彩票选择与估价中偏好反转的不对称性，提出当风险态度事前不完全已知时，偏好诱导程序通过影响信息获取激励内生地改变揭示偏好，实验证实了这一点。
Revealed preferences between lotteries can be asymmetrically reversed across choice and valuation. The ongoing debate is whether the procedure-invariance principle is violated. This research presents a parsimonious theory to reconcile asymmetric preference reversals with procedure invariance. When risk attitude is ex ante imperfectly known, preference-eliciting procedures can endogenously influence revealed preferences through affecting the incentive for information retrieval/acquisition (i.e., deliberation). As predicted, when lottery pairing was known, experiment participants exhibited substantially less asymmetric reversals by stating mean-preserving and more dispersed valuations. Therefore, the endogeneity of asymmetric preference reversals can be substantiated.