Domestic isomorphic pressures in the design of FOI oversight institutions in Latin America
研究了智利、秘鲁和乌拉圭三国信息自由法监督机构制度设计差异的原因，发现政治竞争无法完全解释，而同构压力（国内约束）是关键因素，对理解制度扩散有参考价值。
Abstract Even though many countries in Latin America have adopted FOI Laws, there are significant differences in the institutional design of FOI oversight institutions. Most explanations highlight the role of political competition in motivating political actors to design strong de jure FOI oversight institutions. The design of FOI oversight institutions in Chile, Peru and Uruguay, however, cannot fully be explained by political competition. We show how isomorphic pressures help explain variation in the de jure strength of the FOI oversight institutions. Our findings highlight the importance of considering domestic constraints on the diffusion of one‐size‐fits‐all models. To analyze each case, we conducted a systematic process‐tracing analysis. Our in‐depth analysis allowed us to assess different theories concerning the specific institutional design of FOI oversight institutions.