Team incentives under private contracting
研究了利润最大化的委托人向多个代理人提供私人合同时的团队道德风险问题，发现公共合同虽能实现高效但易导致合谋，而私人合同虽能防止合谋却必然低效。
Abstract We model a moral hazard in teams problem in which a profit‐maximizing principal offers private contracts to multiple agents. Public contracts are common knowledge to all agents, but private contracts are known only by the principal and each individual agent. Public contracts can induce efficient outcomes but are subject to effort‐reducing collusion between the principal and any given agent. Private contracts, by construction, are immune to such collusion but necessarily inefficient, as the principal is forced to make the team collectively the residual claimant (on margin), whereas efficiency requires that each individual agent be the residual claimant on his own.