Playing Hide and Seek: How Lenders Respond to Borrower Protection
利用全量抵押贷款合同数据，研究发现高利率放贷人通过平均降低10%的利率来规避借款人保护法规，而非减少贷款金额或数量。
Abstract This paper uses the universe of mortgage contracts to estimate the response of high-interest lenders to borrower protection regulations aimed at simplifying and making loan terms more transparent. Using a quasi-experimental design, I find that lenders substantially reduce interest rates—by an average of 10%—in order to avoid being subject to borrower protection, without reducing amounts loaned or the number of loans approved. This finding is consistent with high-interest lenders preferring to issue obfuscatory mortgage contracts with lower interest rates rather than more transparent and regulated mortgages with higher interest rates.