The influence of learning and bargaining on CEO–chair duality: Evidence from firms that pass the baton
研究了企业通过“接力棒传递”方式让CEO在观察其表现后再兼任董事会主席，发现这有助于董事会了解CEO能力，市场对早期晋升反应积极，且企业会计业绩未下降。
Abstract Some firms combine CEO and board chair positions after observing CEO performance. We propose that this approach, known as “passing the baton” (PTB), enables the board to learn about the ability and suitability of the CEO before awarding additional title of board chair. Consistent with learning, idiosyncratic stock‐return volatility declines following the CEO–chair combination. The market responds positively (Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) = 1.31%) to early promotions, suggesting that early promotions reveal directors’ private information about CEO quality. Compared to a matched benchmark, we observe no decline in firm's accounting performance in subsequent years. Although match‐adjusted stock returns begin to decline 2 years after combination in homogeneous industries, there is no stock‐return decline in heterogeneous industries where learning is more important. The evidence reveals the potential for entrenchment over time, but we find no evidence to suggest that CEO–chair combinations in PTB firms result from agency problems. Our results underscore the importance of balancing both learning and agency problems in corporate governance.