Loss aversion, labor supply, and income taxation*
假设纳税人对他人消费存在损失厌恶，发现劳动供给对税收的反应取决于其在收入分布中的位置，收入分布越陡峭劳动供给弹性越小，且损失厌恶会削弱收入分布的加总作用，增强社会关切的影响。
Abstract We assume that taxpayers are loss averse in reference to other taxpayers’ consumption. Loss aversion implies that labor supply responses to taxation depend on the taxpayer's position in the income distribution. Consistent with empirical evidence, we find the steeper the ascent on the curve of income distribution, the smaller the labor supply elasticity. In the standard problem of optimal income taxation, the role of income distribution is to aggregate the labor supply effects of taxation. We show that loss aversion can offset the aggregation role of income distribution resulting in a greater role for social concerns.