Creditor Control of Corporate Acquisitions
研究了债权人控制权如何影响企业收购行为，发现贷款协议中近75%包含限制收购的条款，财务契约违反后债权人会收紧这些限制，减少价值破坏的收购，且违规后宣布收购的公司股票回报平均高出1.8%。
Abstract We examine the impact of creditor control rights on corporate acquisitions. Nearly 75$\%$ of loan agreements include restrictions that limit borrower acquisition decisions throughout the life of the contract. Following a financial covenant violation, creditors use their bargaining power to tighten these restrictions and limit acquisition activity, particularly deals expected to earn negative announcement returns. Firms that do announce an acquisition after violating a financial covenant earn 1.8$\%$ higher stock returns, on average, and do not pursue less risky deals. We conclude that creditors use contractual rights and the renegotiation process to limit value-destroying acquisitions driven by managerial agency problems.