Empirical framework for Cournot oligopoly with private information
提出了一个针对不对称古诺寡头垄断的实证框架，考虑企业可变成本的私人信息，通过贝叶斯纳什均衡识别需求与成本分布，并应用于全球原油市场量化私人信息的福利效应。
Abstract We propose an empirical framework for asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with private information about variable costs. First, considering a linear demand for a homogeneous product with a random intercept, we characterize the Bayesian Cournot–Nash equilibrium. Then we establish the identification of the joint distribution of demand and firm‐specific cost distributions. Following the identification steps, we propose a likelihood‐based estimation method and apply it to the global market for crude oil and quantify the welfare effect of private information. We also consider extensions of the model to include product differentiation, conduct parameters, nonlinear demand, or selective entry.