A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions
研究了在代理人相信他人类型同分布但实际分布未知时，如何设计激励相容的转移支付，并刻画了通过直接机制实现完全实施的条件，将问题转化为受激励约束的战略外部性网络设计。
Abstract We study robust mechanism design in environments in which agents commonly believe that others’ types are identically distributed, but we do not assume that the actual distribution is common knowledge, nor that it is known to the designer. First, we characterize all incentive compatible transfers under these assumptions. Second, we characterize the conditions under which full implementation is possible via direct mechanisms, that only elicit payoff relevant information, and the transfer schemes which achieve it whenever possible. The full implementation results obtain from showing that the problem can be transformed into one of designing a network of strategic externalities, subject to suitable constraints which are dictated by the incentive compatibility requirements.