The Effects of Supranational Delegation on Policy Development
利用《罗马条约》授权数据与欧洲当局立法和判例数据（1958-2000），发现立法和行政授权程度越高，次级立法量越大，但判例量不受影响；司法授权则增加判例量并限制立法活动；条约条款的精确性约束次级立法量。
Abstract Studies on delegation to international organizations have extensively examined the determinants of supranational delegation. Yet, systematic empirical accounts on the effects of different types and degrees of delegation on policy developments remain limited. This paper addresses this gap by using a novel dataset that combines delegation data from the Treaty of Rome with data on legislation and case law developed by the European authorities (1958–2000). The analysis produces three findings. First, a higher level of delegation of legislative and executive functions has a positive effect on the volume of secondary legislation, but no effect on the volume of case law. Second, a higher level of judicial delegation has a positive effect on the volume of case law, while limiting legislative activity. Third, the precision of the Treaty provisions constrains the volume of secondary legislation. The findings show how the type and intensity of supranational delegation shape supranational policy development.