Crisis and non-crisis short selling and bank enforcement actions
利用标准知情交易理论，研究了2007-2012年美国上市银行在危机与非危机时期，卖空者在银行执法行动前后的行为差异，发现危机中卖空者提前布局，非危机中执法行动反而吸引更多卖空。
Employing standard informed trading intuition, we develop testable hypotheses regarding short selling before and after bank enforcement action (EA) initiations. For U.S.-listed bank firm data for 2007 to 2012, we find strong support for differentiated short seller activity and skill in crisis versus non-crisis periods. In financial crises, short sellers predominantly position prior to EAs. The EA initiations then act as information-homogenizing and profit-taking events reducing incentives to remain positioned. In contrast, EAs in non-crisis periods appear to serve as wake-up calls that attract additional short selling. Our findings offer potentially important insights for regulators considering short sellers’ reactions to EA announcements in general, during financial crises, and when not experiencing a broad financial crisis.