Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing Versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?
研究了银行如何通过减少监管调整来膨胀监管资本比率，并发现国家当局出于短期经济考虑对国内银行采取宽容态度，导致各国监管资本膨胀存在显著差异。
Abstract We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments (without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk). We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.