Credibility in second-price auctions: an experimental test
通过实验室实验，首次直接检验拍卖形式的可信度如何影响投标行为和最终结果，发现不可信的第二价格拍卖并未如理论预测那样收敛到第一价格拍卖，并基于卖方对违规的厌恶提供了行为解释。
Abstract We provide the first direct test of how the credibility of an auction format affects bidding behavior and final outcomes. To do so, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments where the role of the seller is played by a human subject who receives the revenue from the auction and who (depending on the treatment) has agency to determine the outcome of the auction. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that the non-credible second-price auction fails to converge to the first-price auction. We provide a behavioral explanation for our results based on sellers’ aversion to rule-breaking, which is confirmed by an additional experiment.