Choice Screen Auctions
研究了谷歌安卓平台选择屏幕拍卖中“按展示”与“按安装”两种计费方式对拍卖结果和搜索引擎激励的影响，并结合2020年实证数据验证理论结论。
Choice screen auctions have been recently deployed in 31 European countries, allowing consumers to choose their preferred search engine on Google’s Android platform instead of being automatically defaulted to Google’s own search engine. I show that a seemingly minor detail in the design of these auctions—whether they are conducted on a “per appearance” or a “per install” basis—plays a major role in the mix and characteristics of auction winners and, consequently, in their expected market share. Furthermore, per install auctions distort search engines’ incentives. Empirical evidence from Android choice screen auctions conducted in 2020 is consistent with my theoretical results.