Large Shareholder Portfolio Diversification and Voluntary Disclosure*
研究发现大股东投资组合越多元化，公司自愿披露信息越多，因为多元化股东更依赖公开信息而非私下获取，这降低了外部利益相关者的信息成本。
ABSTRACT Although large shareholders have sufficient influence to engage privately with management, extant literature provides inconclusive evidence on the relation between large equity positions and corporate disclosure. This study examines whether large shareholders' portfolio diversification affects voluntary corporate disclosure. We define diversification as the extent to which investors spread investments among portfolio stocks. We predict that holding a diversified portfolio deters large shareholders from incurring the costs of private information gathering about a portfolio firm. We document that firms provide more voluntary disclosure when their large shareholders hold a more diversified portfolio, consistent with investors relying more on public disclosure about portfolio firms when their portfolio diversification is higher. Evidence from cross‐sectional analyses suggests that, as predicted, the positive relation between portfolio diversification and voluntary disclosure is weaker as the net benefit of acquiring private information increases for large shareholders (i.e., when portfolio firms are more connected, have alternative information channels, or are more complex). Overall, our results suggest that diversified large shareholders' preference for a richer public disclosure environment creates a positive externality of lowering the information costs for external stakeholders without private access to management.