CHOKED BY RED TAPE? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WASTEFUL TRADE BARRIERS
研究了游说压力下的繁文缛节壁垒与传统贸易壁垒的不同影响，发现关税降低会引发保护主义反弹，而自然贸易成本降低则可能减少繁文缛节壁垒，且政治不确定性会增加其使用。
Abstract The implications of red‐tape barriers (RTBs) under lobbying pressures differ markedly from those of traditional trade barriers. RTBs affect the extensive margin of trade and may respond in opposite ways to reductions in tariffs versus reductions in natural trade costs: The former induce a protectionist backlash that may reduce trade both at the intensive and extensive margin, whereas the latter may induce a reduction in RTBs magnifying the direct trade‐increasing effects. Furthermore, if tariff commitments are optimized, the availability of RTBs limits the extent of tariff liberalization, and political uncertainty tends to increase the prevalence of RTBs.