A hidden hand in corporate lobbying
研究发现机构投资者持股比例高的企业游说活动更多，且机构投资者会与投资组合公司共同游说同一法案，推动法案通过并带来超额收益，同时反对增加游说披露的股东提案以保护企业政治信息。
Abstract I investigate the role of institutional investors in firms’ lobbying activities. Firms with greater lobbying institutional ownership lobby more. Using a novel dataset with lobbying information on congressional bills, I show that institutional investors support portfolio firms by lobbying together on same bills. Bills lobbied by institutional investors are more likely to become laws and the passage of such bills leads to greater abnormal returns. Additional evidence suggests that institutional investors protect firms’ private political information by voting against shareholder proposals requesting additional lobbying disclosure. The findings have an important economic implication: financial institutions provide a helping hand in firms’ external governance related to law and politics.