The Political Economy of Immigration Enforcement: Conflict and Cooperation under Federalism
研究了美国联邦与地方在移民执法中的互动，发现80%的县对联邦执法存在策略性替代，而联邦能有效引导合作县；2011年联邦优先事项变化后，驱逐减少主因是案件特征变化而非联邦执法减弱。
Abstract Selection forces often confound the effects of policy changes. In the immigration enforcement context, we tackle this challenge tracking arrested immigrants along the deportation pipeline, isolating local and federal efforts. 80% of counties exhibit strategic substitutabilities in responding to federal enforcement, while the federal level is very effective at directing its efforts toward cooperative counties. We estimate that changes in the profile of immigration cases, and not weakened federal efforts, drove the reduction in deportations following a 2011 shift in federal priorities. Reducing immigration-court discretion and removing their dependence from the executive would have a significant impact on deportations.