Trade sanctions and the stability of climate coalitions
研究了当外部国家报复时，贸易制裁能否促进自我执行国际环境协议中的气候合作，发现制裁仅在联盟足够大时才有效，且可能损害全球福利。
We investigate whether trade sanctions against outsiders can foster climate cooperation in self-enforcing international environmental agreements if outsiders retaliate. We find a threshold effect: In small coalitions incentives to be a coalition member decrease whereas in large coalitions they increase. Thus, trade sanctions can be an effective tool in climate policy only after a sufficiently large climate coalition has already been formed. Even if larger stable coalitions are achieved with trade sanctions, implications for global welfare can be adverse, because additional trade distortions trade off with the environmental gains. We identify the USA and Europe as essential members of stable coalitions if outsiders retaliate.