Reassessing debt-financing decisions in family firms: Family involvement on the board of directors and generational stage
基于西班牙家族企业大样本数据，研究发现董事会中家族参与度越高、代际阶段越低，企业债务水平越高，揭示了家族企业债务融资决策的异质性。
This paper re-examines the factors influencing debt-financing decisions in family firms, considering the importance of socioemotional wealth and heterogeneity issues. In particular, we explore the board of directors and generational stage as key explicative factors of heterogeneity in family businesses. Focusing on a large sample of Spanish family firms, we estimate a partial least squares model, whose results show that the higher the level of family involvement on the board of directors and the lower the generational stage, the higher the debt level of the family firm. Consequently, in addition to traditional determinants of the level of debt, the above variables should be considered to better understand the heterogeneous debt-financing decisions of family firms, and this has practical implications for them and their internal and external relationships.