Accounting Quality and Alliance Contract Provisions
研究发现，战略联盟伙伴对一家公司施加的治理条款数量随该公司会计质量提高而减少，且该效应在伙伴议价能力弱、联盟项目风险高时更强。
ABSTRACT We show that the number of governance provisions imposed on a firm by a strategic alliance partner decreases with the firm's accounting quality. This effect is weaker when the firm has greater bargaining power and stronger when the alliance project is riskier. Moreover, the net benefit to an alliance partner of imposing an additional governance provision on its counterparty apparently increases when the counterparty accounting quality is low, resulting in an enhancement of the partner's market value and a reduction in its bankruptcy risk. Furthermore, alliance partners adopt fewer provisions based on their counterparties' accounting numbers when the counterparties' accounting quality is poor. JEL Classifications: D74; M41.