Supplementary Budget and Fiscal Cap
研究委托人分两期分配预算给代理人时，代理人因预期第二期预算调整而降低首期努力的问题，发现两期财政上限可激励最优努力，但末期上限可能过于宽松，其合意性取决于初始预算的刚性。
A principal allocates a budget to an agent in each of two periods. The agent chooses an effort level to efficiently use the budget in period 1, anticipating the principalʼs decision in period 2. The agent can gain a larger budget in period 2 by exerting less effort in period 1. Fiscal caps imposed in both periods can induce the agent to devote the socially optimal level of effort, but the fiscal cap for the final period may be too generous, providing for discretionary expenditure that is contingent upon the state of the overall economy. Whether fiscal constraints are desirable depends on the rigidity applied in the primary budget.