Deposit Requirements in Auctions
研究了当买家可能收到未来外部报价时，最优拍卖设计问题。中标者可能因外部报价而违约，最优机制采用带保留价和保证金的第二价格拍卖，且保证金随外部报价分布恶化而提高。
We examine optimal auction design when buyers may receive future outside offers. The winning bidder may choose to default upon observing her outside offer. Under the optimal mechanism, the bidder with the highest value wins if and only if her value is above a cutoff, and the winner never defaults. The optimal auction takes the form of a second-price auction with a reserve price and a deposit by the winning bidder. Under regularity conditions, both the optimal reserve price and the deposit increase when the distribution of outside offers worsens.