Can Sell-side Analysts Compete Using Public Information? Analysts as Frame-makers Revisited
通过实地研究分析师如何利用季度财报电话会等公共信息与客户和经理互动，挑战了分析师必须依赖私有信息竞争的观点，发现公共信息在竞争中起核心作用。
This paper extends qualitative research on sell-side analysts by investigating how analysts compete against each other in the market for investment advice. The paper challenges the assumption that analysts must utilize private information in such competition, and investigates the role of a public setting – the quarterly earnings presentation – for analysts’ analytical work and client communication. The paper draws on an in-depth field study, comprising observations and interviews, and theorizes analysts as frame-makers when analyzing the materials. The study reveals how accounting reports place assumptions within the valuation practices of the share into question and risk ‘overflowing’ established calculative frames. The analysts utilized such uncertainty to enhance their dialogues with both clients and managers. Reacting to public information, therefore, served a central role for analysts’ competition, whereas proactively developing investment cases and acquiring private information were of less importance. These findings are discussed against recent developments of the sell-side industry’s remuneration models, and it is argued that experience has become an increasingly valuable quality. The paper also contributes to the perspective of analysts as frame-makers by shifting attention to overflows and how calculative frames develop through so-called ‘cold’ negotiations.