Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects
研究了合作者受声誉激励时，合作策略如何受公众对联合工作成果的信用分配影响，发现对称均衡常不稳定，非对称均衡中个体因无关身份获得不同信用，并比较了不同均衡下的福利。
We study collaborative work in pairs when potential collaborators are motivated by the reputational implications of (joint or solo) projects. In equilibrium, individual collaboration strategies both influence and are influenced by the public assignment of credit for joint work across the two partners. We investigate the fragility of collaboration to small biases in the public’s credit assignment. When collaborators are symmetric, symmetric equilibria are often fragile, and in nonfragile equilibria individuals receive asymmetric collaborative credit based on payoff-irrelevant “identities.” We study payoff distributions across identities within asymmetric equilibria, and compare aggregate welfare across symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.