Audit Committee Accounting Expertise and the Mitigation of Strategic Auditor Behavior
研究发现审计委员会成员的会计专长能减少审计师与客户间的信息不对称，从而限制审计师过度审计或审计不足，具体表现为降低审计费用、减少重大缺陷修复后的费用溢价以及在高竞争市场中降低重述概率。
ABSTRACT Our study is motivated by the theory of credence goods in the auditing setting. We propose that audit committee accounting expertise should reduce information asymmetries between the auditor and the client, thereby limiting auditors' ability to over-audit and under-audit. Consistent with this notion, our results indicate that when audit committees have accounting expertise, clients (1) pay lower fees when changes in standards decrease required audit effort; (2) pay a smaller fee premium in the presence of remediated material weaknesses; and (3) have a reduced likelihood of restatement when audit market competition is high. Our findings in the under-auditing setting generally are strongest among non-Big 4 engagements, consistent with non-Big 4 auditors being less sensitive to market-wide disciplining mechanisms such as reputation, legal liability, and professional regulation. We also provide evidence that the nature of audit committee members' accounting expertise differentially impacts the committee's ability to curtail over- and under-auditing. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42.