The Origins and Control of Forest Fires in the Tropics
利用印度尼西亚15年卫星数据，研究外部性如何影响非法热带森林火灾决策，发现产权弱化导致过度用火，而私人产权和政府制裁能有效抑制火灾。
Abstract Environmental externalities—uncompensated damages imposed on others—lie at the root of climate change, pollution, deforestation and biodiversity loss. Empirical evidence is limited, however, as to how externalities drive private decision making. We study one such behaviour, illegal tropical forest fires, using 15 years of daily satellite data covering over 107,000 fires across Indonesia. Weather-induced variation in fire spread risk and variation in who owns surrounding land allow us to identify how far externalities influence the decision to use fire. Relative to when all spread risks are internalized, we find that firms overuse fire when surrounded by unleased government lands where property rights are weak. In contrast, and consistent with the Coase Theorem, firms treat risks to nearby private concessions similarly to risks to their own land. Government sanctions, concentrated on fires spreading to populated areas, also deter fires, consistent with Pigouvian deterrence.