Do Rewards Encourage Professional Skepticism? It Depends
通过三个实验发现，奖励职业怀疑可能适得其反，降低审计师对未来存在危险信号任务的怀疑程度，但持续一致的奖励能减少风险规避、增强怀疑。
ABSTRACT In three experiments, we find that rewarding professional skepticism can backfire and decrease skepticism on future audit tasks where red flags are present. We focus on rewards for costly skepticism: skepticism that is ex ante appropriate, but generates incremental ex post costs and does not identify a misstatement. Auditors interpret a reward for costly skepticism as a better-than-expected outcome and view subsequent tasks from a risk-averse gain frame. As a result, auditors seek to avoid the downside risk of skeptical action, which decreases auditors' sensitivity to red flags and their willingness to communicate severe red flags to their managers, compromising audit quality. However, we also find that a supervisor consistently rewarding costly skepticism decreases auditors' risk aversion and increases their skepticism. In sum, auditors believe skeptical action has downside risk. A cultural shift toward credible, consistent rewards for appropriate skepticism likely helps ensure that rewards have their intended effect. Data Availability: Contact the authors.