CEO薪酬:来自田野的证据

CEO compensation: Evidence from the field

Journal of Financial Economics · 2023
被引 118 · 同刊同年前 4%
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

通过对董事和投资者的调查,发现CEO薪酬不仅受参与和激励约束,还受公平关切影响;67%的董事为避免争议而牺牲股东价值,导致薪酬水平偏低且结构单一。

Abstract

We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. We find that directors face constraints beyond participation and incentives, and that pay matters not to finance consumption but to address CEOs’ fairness concerns. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy, leading to lower levels and one-size-fits-all structures. Shareholders are the main source of constraints, suggesting directors and investors disagree on how to maximize value. Intrinsic motivation and reputation are seen as stronger motivators than incentive pay. Even with strong portfolio incentives, flow pay responds to performance to fairly recognize the CEO's contribution.

CEO薪酬薪酬决定因素公平关切股东约束