The signaling role of trade credit in bank lending decisions: Evidence from small and medium‐sized enterprises
利用银行-企业贷款层面的机密数据，研究发现商业信用能缓解信息不对称，尤其对银企关系不透明的企业，能提高获得贷款的概率，但异常付款延迟会带来负面影响。
Abstract Using confidential data at the bank–firm loan‐level, we provide direct evidence of the signaling role of trade credit in bank lending decisions. Especially for firms that are opaque in their relationship with banks, the findings reveal that trade credit ameliorates information asymmetries. We address the questions of whether and, if so, how the presence of trade credit affects banks’ decisions to grant commercial loans. We base the analysis on a sample of small and medium‐sized enterprises to examine suppliers’ informational advantage in screening activities in relation to relationship lending arguments. We provide evidence that supports the role of trade credit as a signaling instrument in lending decisions. More precisely, the analysis suggests that trade credit plays a signaling role, increasing the probability of obtaining a loan. Suppliers bearing credit risk lead banks to lend to firms. Thus, a bank receiving this signal is more likely to grant a loan even though abnormal payment delays are perceived as negative and function as friction during the lending process. This paper has two implications: Banks should use suppliers to signal a “good” type of borrower and for firms, sharing credit information could ameliorate the rationing problems arising in the context of credit asymmetries.