Terrorism hazard and infrastructure projects: The moderating role of home experience and institutions
研究了恐怖主义危害对私人参与基础设施项目完成情况的影响，发现东道国政府问责会加剧负面效应，而投资者在恐怖主义危害国家的经验能缓解这种影响。
This paper analyzes the impact of terrorism hazard on the performance of private participation infrastructure projects. Applying transaction cost theory, we hypothesize that terrorism hazard has a negative relationship with infrastructure project completion, and that host government accountability and investor experience with terrorism hazard have opposing impacts on this relationship. Host government accountability, we argue, produces higher indirect costs of managing terrorism hazard, which reduces investor confidence, and reinforces the negative relationship between terrorism hazard and the probability of satisfactory project completion. Conversely, investor’s experience with terrorism hazard increases investor confidence and hence partially mitigates the negative consequences of terrorism hazard which hamper project completion. Hence, the impact of terrorism is weakened for projects led by firms from higher terrorism hazard countries. We find support for our hypotheses using a sample of 5,083 projects in 135 countries from 2002 to 2017.