Capping Bundle Discounts: Two Regulatory Rationales*
研究了超市与加油站混合捆绑折扣的竞争效应，发现无监管的折扣可能导致独立零售商退出市场，而设置适中的折扣上限能最大化消费者剩余并保护所有消费者利益。
Mixed‐bundling of groceries and gasoline is common, but it raises ‘predatory’ concerns. This paper extends the standard Hotelling approach to consider bundled discounts when two conglomerates and an independent gasoline retailer compete. We show that bundling may result in exit and analyze the effects of capping discounts—a regulatory solution adopted in Australia. The optimal cap depends on the regulator’s objective and the potential for exit. When unregulated discounting leads to exit, an intermediate cap maximises consumer surplus. A cap also ensures that no consumer is worse off with the discounts, an outcome that does not occur with unregulated discounts.