Institutional Arrangements and Inflation Bias: A Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Approach
利用1960-2018年25个工业化国家的数据，采用动态异质性面板方法，研究货币与审慎政策的制度安排是否导致通胀偏差，发现分离宏观审慎监管与货币政策对通胀结果无显著影响。
Abstract The paper investigates whether the institutional arrangements that determine the conduct of monetary and prudential policies influence policymakers' actions in pursuing their designated mandates. Employing recently developed dynamic heterogeneous panel methods and using data for 25 industrialized countries from 1960 to 2018, we empirically assess whether central banks' main objective of inflation stability is compromised when assigned with both policy mandates manifested as inflation bias. Our results show that, once we appropriately control for relevant policy and institutional factors, the separation of macroprudential regulation and monetary policy does not have a significant effect on inflation outcomes.