Risk shocks, due loans, and policy options: When less is more!
通过一个包含银行系统的结构模型，分析了不同宏观审慎政策在应对逾期贷款时的效果，发现当管理成本较低时，宽松的减值确认政策优于严格政策，而降低违规处罚则无效。
We employ a structural model endowed with a banking system in which assets of different qualities, occasionally binding credit restrictions, and regulatory requirements coexist, to analyze the effectiveness of various macroprudential policies that cope with the level of due loans in the economy. We analyze how policy designs influencing impairment recognition by banks affect output and welfare, both in the steady state and across business cycles driven by financial risk. The cost of managing due loans, credit constraints, dividend strategies, and the cure rate, are key components of the driveshaft propelling policies to outcomes. Our findings suggest that “less is more,” i.e. policies emphasizing greater leniency in impairment recognition outperform stricter approaches, when management costs are sufficiently low, especially when combined with high cure rates that enhance the benefits of delaying recognition. However, reducing penalties for banks that violate regulatory requirements proves largely ineffective and exacerbates incentives for non-compliance. The presence of binding credit constraints enhances the effectiveness of lenient impairment policies when management costs are low and diminishes it otherwise.