Trade liberalization and decentralization of state‐owned enterprises: Evidence from China
研究贸易自由化如何影响国有企业被下放的概率，发现投入品关税下降降低了下放概率，而产出品关税下降则提高下放概率，且距离监管政府越远，这种效应越强。
Abstract This paper examines the relationship between trade liberalization and the probability of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) being decentralized. We find that tariff cuts for inputs significantly lower the probability of a SOE being decentralized, whereas tariff cuts for outputs raise this probability. We also find that as the distance from a SOE to its overseeing government increases, the effects of input and output tariff cuts on the probability of SOEs decentralization become stronger. Our empirical results are consistent with a simple model in which local governments try to balance the costs of supervising SOEs against the profits extracted from SOEs.