Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries, and competing paths of diffusion in networks
研究信息商品在网络中如何定价和扩散，通过节点等价关系揭示网络结构对利润分配的影响，区分瓶颈链接与竞争性链接，分析竞争如何限制间接获利能力。
We investigate how information goods are priced and diffused over links in a network. A new equivalence relation between nodes captures the effects of network architecture and locations of sellers on the division of profits, and characterizes the topology of competing (and potentially overlapping) diffusion paths. Sellers indirectly appropriate profits over intermediation chains from buyers in their equivalence classes. Links within the same class constitute bottlenecks for information diffusion and confer monopoly power. Links that bridge distinct classes are redundant for diffusion and generate competition among sellers. In dense networks, competition limits the scope of indirect appropriability and intellectual property rights foster innovation.