Communities, Co-ops, and Clubs: Social Capital and Incentives in Large Collective Organizations
研究了大型集体组织中，当货币转移不可行时，如何通过驱逐和休息两种渠道提供激励，并利用声誉系统实现最优组织设计。
We study a continuous-time organization design problem. Each member’s output is an imperfect signal of his underlying effort, and each member’s utility from remaining in the organization is endogenous to other members’ efforts. Monetary transfers are assumed infeasible. Incentives can be provided only through two channels: expulsion following poor performance and respite following good performance. We derive the steady state distribution of members’ continuation utilities for arbitrary values of the initial and maximum continuation utilities and then optimize these values according to organizational objectives. An optimally designed organization can be implemented by associating continuation utilities with a performance-tracking reputation system.