Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Social Responsibility
利用美国各州普遍需求法通过和第九巡回法院证券集体诉讼裁决带来的外生变化，研究发现股东诉讼权利减弱会降低企业社会责任评分，且这种关系在诉讼风险高的公司中更强，而降低的CSR评分反而提升了企业价值。
Abstract This research examines the relation between shareholder litigation and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Exploiting exogenous changes in shareholder litigation rights following the staggered adoption of universal demand laws by U.S. states and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling on securities class action lawsuits, we show that weaker shareholder litigation rights lead to lower CSR scores. Moreover, the relation is stronger for firms facing higher litigation risk, and a decreased CSR score enhances firm value. Our evidence suggests that firms engage in CSR activities partly to reduce shareholder litigation risk ex ante and mitigate its consequences ex post.