Policy Experimentation in Committees: A Case against Veto Rights under Redistributive Constraints
研究委员会在动态博弈中如何选择风险改革或安全方案，发现无否决权且允许再分配时总能实现最优实验，而否决权比再分配约束本身更阻碍最优政策实验。
We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either a risky reform or a safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed, the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When redistribution is allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule without veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights are more of an obstacle to optimal policy experimentation than are the constraints on redistribution themselves.