Party Building or Noisy Signaling? The Contours of Political Conformity in Chinese Corporate Governance
研究了中国企业如何响应2015年中共发起的党建政策，发现约10%的上市国企未遵守强制要求，而近6%的民企自愿遵守，且采纳条款差异大，受所有权结构和政治关联影响。
We examine responses by Chinese firms to a party-building policy launched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2015 to reform China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The policy requires SOEs to follow a model template of charter amendments to formalize and elevate the role of the CCP in their corporate governance. During the period 2015–18, about 10 percent of publicly traded SOEs failed to follow the mandatory policy, while nearly 6 percent of privately owned enterprises (POEs) complied even though they were not subject to the policy. We find wide variation in the provisions adopted within and across ownership types, with SOE adoptions apparently affected by their ownership structures and exposure to capital market forces and POE adoptions associated with political connections. Our findings highlight the complex contours of political conformity in Chinese firms and raise questions about the trajectory of Chinese corporate governance reform and foreign investment activity.