Networks, Property, and the Division of Labor
通过模拟方法研究不同网络结构如何影响经济生产者发展互补性劳动分工的倾向，发现分工在专业化选择受限时更易演化，且产权存储能力促进分工发展。
We use a simulation-based method to consider the effect of different network structures on the propensity for economic producers to develop a complementary division of labor. We use a graph-coloring game, in which nodes are given incentives to find a color that does not match their nearest neighbors, to represent the interdependent coordination problems inherent to the division of labor. We find that a decentralized development of a division of labor is difficult, particularly when too many specializations are chosen. Counterintuitively, a division of labor is more likely to evolve when the ability of agents to specialize is more constrained. The ability to store property also facilitates the development of a division of labor.