Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection
研究了逆向选择下的竞争性配置，给出了无利可图进入的一般充要条件，并刻画了唯一预算平衡的分配，该分配可通过歧视性升价拍卖实现，为竞争性非排他市场提供了清晰预测。
This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We first provide a general necessary and sufficient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprofitable. We then use this result to characterize, for an active market, a unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by a market tariff making additional trades with an entrant unprofitable. Motivated by the recursive structure of this allocation, we finally show that it emerges as the essentially unique equilibrium outcome of a discriminatory ascending auction. These results yield sharp predictions for competitive nonexclusive markets.