The Party Structure of Mutual Funds
通过分析共同基金对投资组合公司股份的投票数据，运用无监督学习揭示其公司治理偏好存在两个核心维度，并将基金划分为三个党派：传统治理党、股东改革党和股东抗议党。
Abstract We investigate the structure of mutual funds’ corporate governance preferences as revealed by how they vote their shares in portfolio companies. We apply unsupervised learning tools from the machine learning literature to analyze mutual funds’ votes and find that a parsimonious two-dimensional model can explain the bulk of mutual fund voting. The dimensions capture competing visions of corporate governance and are related to the leading proxy advisors’ recommendations. Cluster analysis shows that mutual funds are organized into three “parties”—the Traditional Governance Party, Shareholder Reform Party, and Shareholder Protest Party—that follow distinctive philosophies of corporate governance and shareholders’ role. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.