Equity Short Selling and the Bank Loan Market
研究发现放松卖空限制能帮助银行筛选出低质量借款人，剩余借款人的贷款利差更低，信息不对称和信用风险也得到改善。
Abstract Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we show that relaxation of short‐sale constraints helps to filter out low‐quality borrowers from the bank loan market. Treated firms that can still borrow from banks enjoy a lower loan spread, compared with control firms without this sorting mechanism. The results show that such treated borrowers have improved information asymmetry and credit risk, as well as better nonprice contract terms. Overall, equity short selling has a real effect on the bank loan market by weeding out poor‐quality borrowers, resulting in a lower cost of private debt for remaining borrower firms.