Competing data intermediaries
研究数据中介之间的竞争模型，发现竞争对消费者利益影响有限，数据非竞争性可能导致市场集中和高利润，甚至维持垄断结果。
Abstract I study a model of competition between data intermediaries, which collect personal data from consumers and sell them to downstream firms. Competition has a limited impact on benefiting consumers: If intermediaries offer high compensation for data, consumers share data with multiple intermediaries, which lowers the downstream price of data and hurts intermediaries. Anticipating this, intermediaries offer low compensation for data. Although consumers are exclusive suppliers of data, the nonrivalry of data can lead to concentration and high intermediary profits in data markets. In particular, if downstream firms use data to extract surplus from consumers, competing intermediaries sustain a monopoly outcome.