Self-Selection into Corrupt Judiciaries
通过实验游戏和调查，比较乌克兰精英法学院中志向成为法官、检察官的学生与志向成为辩护律师、商业律师的学生，发现前者更愿意作弊或行贿，且利他性更低，表明腐败可能部分源于公民自我选择进入政府机构。
Abstract Drawing on experimental games and a survey conducted with university students at an elite legal academy in Ukraine, this study compares the behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic traits of students aspiring to public sector legal careers as judges, prosecutors, and investigators with their counterparts aiming to pursue private sector legal careers as defense attorneys and commercial lawyers. I find evidence that students pursuing public sector legal careers display more willingness to cheat or bribe in experimental games as well as lower levels of altruism. These findings indicate that corruption in some societies may persist in part from the self-selection into government institutions of citizens with a higher propensity to seek profit from illicit activities. Moreover, the findings suggest that such corrupt self-selection can infect a country’s judicial and law enforcement apparatus, with potentially dire implications for the rule of law.