Worker Participation in Decision‐making, Worker Sorting, and Firm Performance
利用德国雇主-雇员匹配数据，研究发现设有工人委员会的企业雇佣了更高质量的工人，且工人质量在委员会引入前已较高，引入后进一步提升；考虑工人分类后，工人参与仍对生产率和盈利能力有积极影响。
Worker participation in decision‐making is often associated with high‐wage and high‐productivity firm strategies. Using linked employer–employee data for Germany and worker fixed effects from a two‐way fixed‐effects model of wages capturing observed and unobserved worker quality, we find that plants with formal worker participation via works councils indeed employ higher quality workers. We show that worker quality is already higher in plants before council introduction and further increases after the introduction. Importantly, we corroborate previous studies by showing positive productivity and profitability effects even after taking into account worker sorting.