“Moving Umbrella”: Bureaucratic transfers and the comovement of interregional investments in China
研究中国城市间官员调动如何带动企业跨区域投资，发现调动后约3%的投资随之流动，但官员并未因此晋升，反而面临更高反腐风险。
This paper studies the pattern of interregional investment after bureaucratic transfers across Chinese cities. Using the administrative records of business registration, we find that the transfer of a local leader between prefecture cities is associated with about 3% increase in interregional investment along the direction of transfer. The comoving firms purchase larger parcels of land and at lower prices. They also exhibit a higher likelihood of exiting when the patrons leave the office. Comoving interregional investment does not increase the probability of promotion for transferred leaders, and yet expose them to a higher risk of anticorruption prosecution. The findings highlight the importance of personal connection between firms and bureaucrats in shaping the pattern of interregional investment.