Simple bets to elicit private signals
提出两种简单赌博机制（顶底赌注和阈值赌注），用于从群体中获取不可验证的私人信号，放松了共同先验、同质风险中性等标准假设。
This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms—top‐flop and threshold betting—to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen bet to reveal the agents' private signal even if the underlying ratings are biased. We further provide microeconomic foundations of the ratings, which are endogenously determined by the actions of other agents in a game setting. Our mechanisms relax standard assumptions of the literature, such as common prior, and homogeneous and risk neutral agents.