The factor market spillover effects of shareholder activism
研究股东积极主义如何通过CEO人才在要素市场的可转移性，对非目标公司的利润和CEO薪酬产生正向溢出效应，并指出这种溢出导致干预效率不足。
Abstract Firms and CEOs are linked in the factor market because CEO talents are transferable across different firms. Shareholder activism increases the nontarget firm's outside option and reduces the nontarget CEO's outside option. This leads to higher profit and lower CEO compensation at the nontarget firm. Due to this positive spillover, the activist's intervention is inefficiently low. As CEO talents become more transferable, monitoring, and performance improve more and CEO compensation decreases more at the nontarget firm; shareholder activism becomes less efficient due to the increased linkage between CEOs. This paper also provides a number of novel empirical predictions.